A "Sender"(internet advertising platform, seller, rating agency, or school) has a probability distribution over "prospects"(internet ads, products, bonds, or students). Each prospect is characterized by its pro…tability to the Sender and its relevance to a "Receiver"(internet user, consumer, investor, or employer). The Sender privately observes the pro…tability and relevance of the prospect, whereas the receiver observes only a signal provided by the Sender (the prospect's "rating"). The Receiver accepts a given prospect only if his Bayesian inference about its relevance exceeds a private opportunity cost that is uniformly drawn from [0,1]. We characterize the Sender's optimal information disclosure rule assuming commitment power on her behalf. While the Receiver's welfare is maximized by full disclosure, the Sender's pro…ts are typically maximized by partial disclosure, in which the Receiver is induced to accepting less relevant but more pro…table prospects ("switches") by pooling them with more relevant but less pro…table ones ("baits"). Extensions of the model include maximizing a weighted sum of Sender pro…ts and Receiver welfare, and allowing the Sender to subsidize or tax the Receiver.
Introduction
An Internet advertising platform can provide some information to users about the relevance its ads. This information can be signaled by such features as the ad's position on the web page, its font size, color, ‡ashing, etc. Suppose that users have rational expectations and are sophisticated enough to interpret these signals. Then user welfare would be maximized by communicating the ads'relevance to them, allowing them to make fully informed decisions about which ads to click.
The platform, however, may care not just about user welfare, but about its own pro…ts.
Suppose that each potential ad is characterized by its value to consumers and its per-click pro…ts to the platform, and the two are not always aligned. Then the platform would increase its pro…ts by inducing users to click on more pro…table ads.
While the platform would not be able to fool rational users systematically to induce them to click more on less relevant ads, a similar e¤ect could be achieved by withholding some information from them, pooling the less relevant but more pro…table ads with those that are more relevant and less pro…table.
Similar information disclosure problems arise in other economic settings: 1. A seller chooses which information to disclose to consumers about its products, which vary both in their pro…tability to the seller and their value to consumers.
A bond rating agency chooses what information to disclose to investors about bond
issuers, who also make payments to the agency for the rating.
3.
A school chooses what information to disclose to prospective employers about the ability of its students, who also pay tuition to the school.
In each of these cases, the pro…t-maximizing information disclosure rule may be partially but not fully revealing. This paper characterizes the optimal information disclosure rule in such settings. Our basic model has two agents -the "Sender" and the "Receiver." The Sender (who can be alternatively interpreted as an advertising platform, seller, rating agency, or school) has a probability distribution over "prospects" (ads, products, bonds, or students, respectively).
Each prospect is characterized by its pro…tability to the Sender and its value to the Receiver (user, consumer, investor, or employer), which are not observed by the Receiver. First, the Sender chooses an information disclosure rule about the prospects. Then a prospect is drawn at random and a signal about it is shown to the Receiver according to the rule. The Receiver then makes a rational inference about the prospect's value from the disclosed signal and chooses whether to accept the prospect (click on the ad, buy the product, invest in the bond, hire the student) or to reject it.
The problem of designing the optimal information disclosure rule turns out to be amenable to elegant analysis under the special assumption that the Receiver's private reservation value (equivalently, opportunity cost of accepting a prospect) is drawn from a uniform distribution, with support normalized to the interval [0, 1] . Then the probability of a prospect's acceptance simply equals the Receiver's expectation of its value. For convenience, we also assume that the distribution from which prospects come is …nite-valued, and that the Sender can randomize in sending signals. 1 Under these assumptions, we characterize the optimal disclosure rule. In particular, we establish that this rule must have the following properties:
It is optimal to pool two prospects (i.e., to send the same signal for each of them with a positive probability) when they are "non-ordered" (i.e. one has a higher and lower value than the other). When two prospects "ordered"(i.e. one dominates the other in both value and pro…t), it is never optimal to pool them.
When we describe each potential signal shown to the Receiver by the prospect's expected pro…t and expected value conditional on the signal, the set of such signals must be ordered, i.e., for any two signals, one must dominate the other in both value and pro…t.
Any set of prospects that are pooled with each other (i.e., result in the same signal) with a positive probability must lie on a straight line in the (pro…t,value) space. For the "generic" case in which no three prospects are on the same line, this implies that any signal can pool at most two prospects.
Two intervals connecting pooled prospects cannot intersect in the (pro…t,value) space.
When one prospect is higher than another in both value and pro…t, it can only be pooled into a higher signal than the other.
In the "generic"case, the set of prospects can be partitioned into three subsets: "pro…t"
prospects, "value" prospects, and "isolated" prospects, so that any possible pooling involves one "pro…t" prospect and one "value" prospect, with the "pro…t" prospect having a higher pro…t and a lower value than the "value" prospect it is pooled with.
Each "pro…t"or "value"prospect is pooled with some other prospect with probability 1, whereas each "isolated"prospect is never pooled.
While these results tell us a great deal about the optimal disclosure mechanism, they do not fully describe it: They still leave many ways to choose the pooling graph, and to choose probabilities with which a given prospect is pooled with its potential pooling partners. Fortunately, the Sender's expected pro…t-maximization problem with these probabilities turns out to have a concave objective function and linear constraints (that the probabilities add up to 1). Its solution can then be characterized by the …rst-order conditions, which we derive.
A complication arises due to the fact that the objective function is not di¤erentiable in the probabilities of pooling with a given signal when this signal has probability zero. This matters because typically only a subset of signals can have positive probabilities at a solution.
One way to overcome this problem is by trying di¤erent subset of signals (pooling pairs), using …rst-order conditions to …nd optimal probabilities of pooling into these signals, and then choose the subset with the maximal expected pro…ts. Another way is by …rst solving the perturbed maximization problem subject to the additional constraint that each prospect is pooled with each potential partner with probability at least epsilon, and then taking epsilon to zero to approach the solution to the unconstrained problem.
In the general analysis we take the pro…tability of each prospect to the Sender as given.
Yet we can apply this analysis to applications in which the Sender is an intermediary between the Receiver and an independent Advertiser who owns the prospects. The Sender's mechanism design problem then includes the design of payments that the Advertiser is charged for the signal about his prospect that is shown to the Receiver. For example, an online advertising platform charges advertisers di¤erent payments for di¤erent signals (ad placement etc.).
In the extreme case where the Sender has full information about the Advertiser's pro…ts, he can charge him payments that extract these pro…ts fully, in which case the disclosure rule design problem becomes the same as if she owned the prospects. But we also consider the more interesting case in which the Advertiser has private information about the prospects' pro…tability to them. For example, online advertisers may have private information about their per-click pro…ts, and so any mechanism designed by the platform will leave advertis-ers with some information rents. By subtracting these rents from the total pro…ts, we can calculate the pro…ts collected by the platform as the Advertiser's "virtual pro…ts,"which is the part of his pro…ts that can be appropriated by the platform.
We consider an application with this structure, where the Advertiser's private information is his per-click pro…t . In addition, there is a signal of the Advertiser's relevance that is observed both by the Sender and the Advertiser. The prospect's value to consumers is given by a function v( ; ), which allows for the Advertiser's private information to a¤ect the prospect's value to the Receiver. The Sender (e.g., an advertising platform) o¤ers a mechanism to the Advertiser, which without loss can be a direct revelation mechanism: the Advertiser reports his pro…ts (e.g., through his bid per click), which together with the relevance parameter determines the probability distribution over the signals revealed to the Receiver about the prospect, as well as the Advertiser's payment to the Sender. We then argue through a simple example that this model may help account for some stylized features of internet advertising.
Finally, we consider a few extensions of the model. First, if instead of a monopolistic platform there are several platforms competing for users, we may expect a di¤erent Pareto optimal information disclosure rule to emerge, which maximizes a weighted sum of expected pro…ts and consumer welfare. The problem of maximizing this weighted sum is mathematically equivalent to the original problem, upon a linear change of coordinates. As the relative weight on consumer welfare goes up, the optimal rule becomes more revealing (in the limit, it becomes fully revealing).
The second perturbation is to allow the platform to o¤er monetary subsidies or taxes per click. We …nd that given the optimal choice of subsidies/taxes, it becomes optimal to have a fully revealing disclosure rule. 
Related Literature
There exists a large literature on communicating information in Sender-Receiver games, using costly signals such as education (Spence 1977) or advertising (Nelson, 1974, Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984) , disclosure of veri…able information (e.g., Milgrom's 2008 survey), or cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) . Our approach is distinct from this literature in two key respects: (1) our Sender is able to commit to a disclosure rule (thus, formally, we consider the Stackelberg equilibrium rather than the Nash equilibrium of the game), and (2) our Sender has two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional private information. These di¤erences fundamentally alter information disclosure outcomes.
We believe that commitment to an information disclosure rule is a sensible assumption in the applications discussed in the introduction. We can view the Sender as a "long-run" player facing a sequence of "short-run"Receivers. In such a repeated game, a patient longrun player will be able to develop a reputation to play its Stackelberg strategy, provided that enough information is revealed concerning history of play (Fudenberg and Levine 1989).
While an internet advertising platform may be tempted in the short run to fool users into clicking more pro…table ads by overstating their relevance, pursuing this strategy would be detrimental to the platform's long-run pro…ts.
Several papers have considered commitment to optimal disclosure policy by an auctioneer using a given auction format (Milgrom and Weber 1982) and by a monopolist designing an optimal price-discrimination mechanism (Ottaviani and Prat 2001) . The literature has focused on providing su¢ cient conditions for full information disclosure to be optimal (e.g., using the "linkage principle"). In our main model, the Sender does not have a pricing choice, and full information disclosure is generally not optimal.
Another literature related to this paper is that on certi…cation intermediaries, starting with Lizzeri (1999) . In Lizzeri's basic model, the certi…cation intermediary is able to capture the whole surplus by revealing either no information, or just enough information for consumers to make e¢ cient choices. The ability to extract consumer surplus is due to the assumption that consumers have no private information (the demand curve is perfectly elastic), as well as the ability to vary the price to consumers (which is not present in our main analysis). The ability to extract producer surplus is due to the producers having no informational advantage over the intermediary (in contrast to our application in which prospects' pro…tability is their private information). The key feature distinguishing our model from this literature is the two-dimensional space of prospects: they di¤er not just in their value to consumers but in their pro…tability (equivalently, costs) to sellers. The key new conclusion in this two-dimensional space is that we have partial information disclosure and partial pooling in speci…c directions. Adding some price ‡exibility to our model (such as per-click subsidies or taxes considered in Subsection 8.2) may make it more appropriate for some applications.
Our model is also closely related to Rayo (2005) , who examines the optimal mechanism for selling conspicuous goods (such as luxury watches, pens, jewelry, or cars) whose only purpose is assumed to be signaling of wealth. This is parallel to our model once we interpret Second, they focus on one-dimensional advertiser type with the sorting condition in the right direction, so that the more pro…table ads are also more valuable to users. On the other hand, they focus on some aspects of sponsored-search auctions that we abstract from, in particular on users'short-run learning about the relevance of a given ad panel by clicking on other ads, and the externalities among ads due to substitution among their products (a consumer who …nds a match on one advertised website does not click on any more ads).
In recent work, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2009) 
Setup
We begin with two players: the Sender and the Receiver. The Sender is endowed with a prospect, which is randomly drawn from a …nite set P = f1; : : : ; N g. The probability of prospect i being realized is denoted by p i > 0, with X i2P p i = 1. Each prospect i 2 P is characterized by its payo¤s ( i ; v i ) 2 R 2 , where i is the prospect's pro…tability to the Sender and v i is its value to the Receiver.
The realized prospect is not directly observed by the Receiver. Instead, the Receiver is shown a signal about this prospect, according to an information disclosure rule:
De…nition 1 A "disclosure rule" h ; Si consists of a …nite set S of signals 2 and a mapping : P ! (S) that assigns to each prospect i a probability distribution (i) 2 (S) over signals.
For example, at one extreme, the "full separation" rule is implemented by taking the signal space S = P and the disclosure rule s (i) = 1 if s = i and s (i) = 0 otherwise. At the other extreme, the "full pooling" rule is implemented by letting S be a singleton.
After observing the signal s, the Receiver decides whether to "accept" (a = 1) or "not accept" (a = 0) the prospect. Whenever the Receiver accepts the prospect, he forgoes an outside option worth r 2 R. Thus, the Sender and Receiver obtain payo¤s equal respectively to a and a (v r) :
We assume the Sender commits to a disclosure rule before the prospect is realized. Thus, the timing is as follows:
1. The Sender chooses a disclosure rule h ; Si.
2.
A prospect i 2 P is drawn.
3. A signal s 2 S is drawn from distribution (i) and shown to the Receiver.
4. The Receiver accepts or rejects the prospect.
Example 1 A search engine (the Sender) shows a consumer (the Receiver) an online advertisement with a link. Based on the characteristics of this advertisement (s), and his own opportunity cost (r), the consumer decides whether or not to click on the link. The online 2 The restriction to a …nite set of signals is without loss of generality in this setting.
advertisement, for instance, may describe a product sold by a separate …rm, in which case the search engine's payo¤ ( ) may correspond to a fee paid by such …rm. We consider this possibility in greater detail in Section 7.
In principle, the Sender may be able to "exclude" a prospect (e.g., by not showing it to the Receiver at all), thus enforcing acceptance decision a = 0. For expositional simplicity for now we do not consider this possibility. Our analysis will thus apply conditional on the probability distribution of the prospects that are not excluded. (And when all prospects have nonnegative pro…ts, the Sender will indeed …nd it optimal not to exclude any of them.)
We explicitly introduce optimal exclusion decisions below in Section 7.
The Receiver knows his outside option r but must make an inference about the prospect's value v from the signal s shown to him. Accordingly, the Receiver optimally sets a = For simplicity, we also restrict v to be in [0, 1] . Under these assumptions, conditional on receiving a given signal s; the probability that a = 1 (the Receiver's "acceptance rate") is
The resulting expected surplus obtained by the Receiver is given by
As for the Sender, her expected pro…t from signal s being accepted is E[ j s], hence her expected pro…t from sending the signal is
Taking the ex ante expectation over the signals, the Receiver and Sender's expected payo¤s for a given disclosure rule can be written, respectively, as
Observe that for the purposes of computing the parties'payo¤s, an information disclosure rule h ; Si is characterized by the total probabilities q s = X i2P p i s (i) that signals s 2 S are sent as well as the parties'posterior expected payo¤s conditional on these signals: Now we consider the e¤ect of information disclosure on the two parties'payo¤s. As far as the Receiver is concerned, it is clear that the more information is disclosed to him, the higher is his expected payo¤. Thus, the Receiver's expected payo¤ is maximized by full separation rule, which gives him a payo¤ of E[
. One way to see this is using Jensen's inequality.
Namely, for any disclosure rule,
At the other extreme, under full pooling, the Receiver's expected payo¤ is only
Again by Jensen's inequality, this is the smallest possible payo¤ among all disclosure rules:
We now turn to the problem of choosing the disclosure rule to maximize the Sender's expected payo¤, which proves to be substantially more complicated and which in general is not solved by either full separation or full pooling.
Characterizing Pro…t-Maximizing Disclosure
The goal is to …nd a disclosure rule that maximizes the expected product of the two coordinates E[ j s] and E[vj s]:
We begin with a simple exercise that will then be used as a key building block for the analysis. The Sender's expected gain from pooling two prospects i and j into one signalŝ (while disclosing information about the other prospects as before) is given by:
Thus, we see that the pro…tability of pooling two prospects depends on how their payo¤s are ordered:
The two prospects are strictly ordered if they are ordered and not unordered; they are strictly unordered if they are unordered and not ordered.
Examination of (4) immediately yields:
Lemma 1 Pooling two prospects yields (strictly) higher pro…ts for the Sender than separating them if the prospects are (strictly) unordered, and yields (strictly) lower pro…ts if the prospects are (strictly) ordered.
A simple intuition for this result is that pooling two prospects preserves the expected acceptance rate but shifts it from the more valuable to the less valuable prospect. When the more valuable prospect is also more pro…table (the "ordered" case), this shift reduces the Sender's expected pro…ts. When instead the more valuable prospect is less pro…table (the "unordered"case), this shift raises the Sender's expected pro…ts.
A more formal explanation for the same result comes from examining the curvature of the product function in di¤erent directions ( ; v) :
and so the function is convex when sign ( ) = sign ( v), but concave when sign ( ) 6 = sign ( v). Thus, by Jensen's inequality, full separation is optimal in the directions of convexity while full pooling is optimal in the directions of concavity.
This simple observation has far-reaching implications for the optimal disclosure rule with any number of prospects. The simplest one is Lemma 2 In a pro…t-maximizing disclosure rule, the set of the signals'payo¤s
is ordered (i.e., any two of its elements are ordered).
Proof. For example, if we just have N = 2 prospects, and the prospects are strictly unordered, optimal information disclosure must involve full pooling, for otherwise there would be two strictly unordered signals. If we instead have N = 2 prospects that are strictly ordered, optimal information disclosure must involve full separation, for otherwise by Lemma 1 we would improve by breaking any signal into separation of the prospects.
For cases with more than two prospects, characterization of optimal disclosure requires more work, as it is typically neither full separation nor full pooling.
De…nition 3
The pool of a signal s 2 S is the set of prospects for which signal s is sent with positive probability, i.e.,
Lemma 3 In a pro…t-maximizing disclosure rule, for any given signal s 2 S, the payo¤s of the prospects in the pool of s, 
This in turn implies 
can only intersect if they share an end point.
Proof. See Figure 2 for intuition. Suppose, in negation, that the above intervals intersect at point z; and this point lies in the interior of at least one of the intervals. For j = 1; 2; let 4 Where
Since j 2 (0; 1) for some j; we may assume without loss that 1 2 (0; 1):
Now consider a new disclosure rule b that is identical to with the following exception:
for all j 6 = k = 1; 2;
where " > 0 is chosen small enough so that b s j (a j ) and b s j (b j ) are positive.
By construction, b and place the same total probability on every signal. In addition, the posterior payo¤s for the a¤ected signals s j are identical under both rules:
where
b s j (i) and the last equality above follows from the fact that both expressions in braces are equal to z:
As a result, b delivers the same payo¤ for the Sender as ; and is therefore optimal.
Nevertheless, since 1 2 (0; 1); the pool of signal s 2 now contains all four prospects, which is a contradiction to lemma 3.
Lemma 5
In any optimal disclosure rule, for any two signals s; s 0 2 S and any two prospects
) and the two points do not coincide, either
, or it is optimal to pool the two signals.
Proof. By Lemma 2, we must either have
. Suppose in negation that (a) the former inequality does not hold, hence the latter one holds, and (b) it is not optimal to pool the two signals, hence Since by assumption x 0 is strictly above L and y 0 is below L, there exists
By the symmetric argument, we also have C 2 [x; y].
But then we can …nd j 2 P s , j 0 2 P s 0 such that the interiors of intervals
and
] intersect at C, and since we also know that the lines L; L 0 on which they lie do not coincide, by Lemma 4 this contradicts optimality of the disclosure rule.
We can further narrow down the structure of optimal pooling when we focus on the "generic"case:
The problem is "generic" if no three prospects lie on the same straight line.
In this case, Lemma 3 tells us that no more than two types can share a given signal s.
5
Thus, any given signal s either fully reveals a speci…c prospect i, or, alternatively, it pools exactly two di¤erent prospects fi; jg. Then the disclosure rule induces a "pooling graph"on P , in which two prospects are linked if and only if they are pooled into one signal. (Note that by Lemma 2 it cannot be optimal to have two distinct signals that both pool two strictly unordered prospects, since then the two signals would themselves be strictly unordered.) In the generic case, we can say even more about the pooling graph:
De…nition 5 For two prospects i; j 2 P , if i j and v i v j then we say that i is "to the SE" of j, and that j is "to the NW" of i:
Lemma 6 In the generic case, an optimal information disclosure rule partitions P into three subsets: the set V of "value prospects," the set of "pro…t prospects," and the set I of "isolated prospects," so that for any signal s, the pool P s consists either of a single prospect i 2 I or of two prospects fi; jg with i 2 V and j 2 , with i being to the NW of j.
Proof. Observe that a given prospect i cannot be optimally pooled with a prospect i SE to the SE of it and also with another prospect i N W to the NW of it. Indeed, were this to happen, letting s SE and s N W represent the two respective signals, the respective posteriors E [ ; vjs SE ] ; E [ ; vjs SW ] would be strictly unordered (here also using genericity), and so by Lemma 2 this could not be an optimal disclosure rule.
Thus, for any given prospect i, there are just three possibilities: (i) it does not participate in any pools, in which case we assign i to I, (ii) all of its pooling partners are to the SE of i, in which case we assign it to V , and (iii) all of its pooling partners are to the NW of i, in which case we assign it to .
Intuitively, Lemma 6 allows us to interpret the prospects from set as "pro…t"prospects and those from set V as "value" prospects. A value prospect is always used as a "bait"
to attract consumers, while a pro…t prospect is always used as a "switch" to exploit the attracted consumers. (Of course, since consumers are rational, they take the probability of being "switched" into account.) The substantive contribution of the lemma is in showing that the role of a pooled prospect in the optimal disclosure rule cannot change: it is either always used as the "bait"or always used as the "switch." Furthermore, it turns out that cycles are "fragile:" they can only be optimal for nongeneric parameter combinations, and even for such combinations there exists another optimal pooling graph that does not contain cycles.
Solving for Optimal Disclosure
The lemmas in the previous section tell us a great deal about the optimal disclosure rule, but do not fully nail it down. In this section we discuss how to solve for the optimal rule. For simplicity we restrict attention to the generic case, in which, by Lemma 3, we can restrict attention to signals that either pool a pair of prospects or separate a prospect. Thus, we can take S = fs P : jsj = 1 or jsj = 2g, where a single-element signal fig separates prospect i while a two-element signal fi; jg is a pool of prospects i and j.
One way to describe such a disclosure rule is by de…ning, for any two-element signal fi; jg P , the weight ij = p i fi;jg (i) -i.e., the mass of point i that is pooled into signal fi; jg. Given these weights, we can calculate the Sender's expected payo¤ (3) as follows. For each signal fi; jg that is sent with a positive probability (i.e., ij + ji > 0), the expected payo¤ from using this signal relative to that from breaking it up into separation can be obtained using formula (4), substituting into it p i = ij and p j = ji . Thus, the seller's expected payo¤ can be written as
The Sender will choose nonnegative weights to maximize this function subject to the constraints X fj;jg P ij p i for all i 2 P , ij 0 for all fi; jg P:
(When the …rst constraint holds with strict equality for some prospect i this means that with the remaining probability the prospect is separated.)
Furthermore, note that the seller strictly prefers not to use any signals fi; jg for which
, that are strictly ordered. (This is also clear from Lemma 1.) Thus, we can restrict attention to pools from the set U = ffi; jg P : Z ij 0g :
Thus, the Sender's program can be written as
Lemma 7 The objective function in (6) 
and noting that it is negative semide…nite. Moreover, since g is continuous at (0; 0), its concavity is preserved when adding this point to the set.
The Lemma implies that the set of solutions to the above program is continuous and convex. We proceed to write …rst-order conditions for the this program. However, before doing so, a word of caution is in order: The function F ( ) proves non-di¤erentiable in ij ; ji at points where ij = ji = 0. Indeed, on the one hand, the partial derivative of F with respect to either ij or ji is zero at any such point. This is simply because raising one of the weights while holding the other at zero has no e¤ect on the information disclosure rule. However, the directional derivative of F in any direction in which ij and ji are raised at once is not zero: in particular, it is positive when i and j are strictly unordered.
We can still make use of …rst-order conditions for program (6) in the variables ij ; ji for signals fi; jg such that ij ; ji 6 = (0; 0), holding the set of such signals …xed at somê S U . Letting i denote the Lagrange multipliers with adding-up constraints (7), the …rst-order conditions can be written as:
In particular, for signals fi; jg and fi; kg to both be sent with a positive probability, we must have
Thus, one way to solve for an optimal disclosure rule is by trying di¤erent sets of signalŝ S U , writing interior …rst-order conditions for all signals fromŜ to be sent with a positive probability, solving for the optimal disclosure rule givenŜ, and calculating the resulting expected pro…t of the Sender. Then we can choose the setŜ that maximizes the Sender's expected pro…ts. We can use Lemma 6 to narrow down the set of possible signal combinations that could be optimal. Still, when the set P of prospects is large, this procedure may be infeasible, since the set of possible signal combinationsŜ can grow exponentially with the number of prospects. For such cases, we propose an alternative approach: choose " > 0 and add the constraints ij + ji " for each (i; j) 2 U . Within the constrained set, the objective function is totally di¤erentiable, hence the solutions can be characterized by …rst-order conditions to the problem. Then, by taking " to zero, we will approach a solution to the unconstrained program.
Finally, while so far we have not allowed the Sender to exclude prospects, it is easy to introduce this possibility, by letting the Sender choose any p i p i , where p i is the true probability of prospect i, and the prospect is therefore excluded with probability p i p i . Note that the Sender will never exclude a prospect with a positive pro…t, since it can always be separated from the others. But the Sender may choose not to exclude even some prospects with a negative pro…t, since if this prospect has a high value the Sender may bene…t by pooling it with another, pro…table prospect.
Cycles and Generic Uniqueness
We begin by noting that there is a trivial reason why problem (6) may have multiple solutions.
Suppose there is an optimum such that, for some prospect i; we have ji = 0 for all j 2 P (i): In this case, regardless of the values of ij , prospect i is isolated. For this reason, the values of ij become immaterial both in terms of the payo¤ for the Sender and the information transmitted to the Receiver, and can therefore be chosen arbitrarily (indeed, the function g( ij ; ji ) is zero whenever either one of its arguments is zero). In order to abstract from this speci…c source of multiplicity, we restrict attention to the subset of optima such that ij = 0 , ji = 0 for all i; j 2 U:
Denote this subset of optima b B = f 2 B : (10) holdsg: The following results establish properties of these optima. All proofs are collected in the Appendix (Section 9). We assume throughout that Z ij 6 = 0 for all i; j 2 U (a generic property). Under an additional generic property for the prospects'payo¤s, the optimum is guaranteed to be unique, and therefore acyclic.
Condition 1 For every subset of prospects fi 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i K g with more than two elements we
Proposition 1 There exists an acyclic optimum. Moreover, under Condition 1, b B has a single element. 6 Formally, we say that is cyclic if its pooling graph contains a cycle, namely, there exists a set of prospects fi 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i K g; with more than two elements, such that both i k ;i k mod K+1 and i k mod K+1 ;i k are strictly positive for every k = 1; 2; :::; K:
An Independent Advertiser
Here we assume that the prospect is owned by a new player, called the Advertiser, rather than the Sender. This prospect is characterized by a parameter vector y = ( ; ) that is randomly drawn from a …nite set Y The prospect's pro…t parameter is privately observed by the Advertiser and its relevance parameter is jointly observed by the Advertiser and the Sender. In this way, the Sender enjoys at least partial knowledge of v: (The Receiver observes neither nor .) Let h( j )
denote the probability of conditional on ; with cumulative function H( j ):
The Sender sells a signal lottery to the Advertiser using a direct-revelation mechanism.
For each value of ; this mechanism requests a report b of the Advertiser's pro…tability and, based on this report, determines: (1) a lottery ( b ; ) 2 (S) and (2) a monetary transfer t( b ; ) 2 R from the Advertiser to the Sender. The goal of the Sender is to maximize expected revenues E [t( ; )] subject to the relevant participation and incentive constraints.
The timing is as follows:
1. The Sender chooses a mechanism consisting of a disclosure rule : Y ! (S) and a transfer rule t : Y ! R.
The Advertiser draws prospect parameters
3. The Advertiser reports b and transfers t( b ; ) to the Sender.
A signal s 2 S is drawn from distribution ( b ; )
5. The Receiver observes s and his reservation value r.
6. The Receiver accepts or rejects the prospect.
We assume that the Receiver has knowledge of the mechanism chosen by the Sender as well as the prior distribution of ( ; ): Accordingly, for any given s; the Receiver's acceptance rate is given by
where the expectation is taken over ( ; ):
On the other hand, for any given mechanism, the net expected pro…t obtained by an
Advertiser who is endowed with parameters ( ; ); and who reports type b ; is given by
where the …rst expectation is taken over s according to the lottery ( b ; ): The participation and incentive constraints indicate, respectively, that this payo¤ must be non-negative and maximized at b = .
For any given ; the highest transfers that the Sender can obtain are determined by a binding participation constraint for the Advertiser with the lowest value of ; and a binding downward-adjacent incentive constraint for all other Advertisers. Accordingly, the Sender's objective becomes
where ( ; ) denotes the "virtual pro…t" that the Sender obtains from an Advertiser with parameters ( ; ). This virtual pro…t is given by
where 0 denotes the type immediately above (provided such a type exists) and
is the inverse hazard rate for :
In addition, the incentive constraints indicate that the Sender must restrict to disclosure rules h ; Si that result in a monotonic allocation. Namely, for any given ; the expected probability that a = 1 must be a nondecreasing function of the Advertiser's pro…t parameter :
Notice that, other than the monotonicity constraint, the Sender's problem of maximizing (11) is identical to the original problem of maximizing (3), where and v are now simply indexed by y = ( ; ): Consequently, whenever the monotonicity constraint is slacked, all results derived in Section 5 apply. The following conditions guarantee that this constraint is in fact slacked:
Condition 2 is automatically met when takes only two values, and is satis…ed in general when the distribution h has an increasing hazard rate and adjacent types ; 0 are evenly spaced.
Condition 3 v( ; ) is nondecreasing in for all :
Condition 3 indicates that more pro…table advertisers also deliver higher consumer surplus.
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Lemma 10 Under conditions 2 and 3 the monotonicity constraint (M ) does not bind.
Proof. Consider a disclosure rule h ; Si that maximizes (11) and is such that the posterior payo¤s of all signals are strictly ordered (which is without loss for the Sender due to Lemma 2 and the fact that any pair of signals with posterior payo¤s that are both ordered and unordered can be pooled without changing her objective). We show that such disclosure rule satis…es (M ).
Suppose not. Then, for some ; there must exist a pair 1 ; 2 ; with 1 < 2 ; such that
This inequality in turn implies that there exist two signals s 1 ; s 2 , with s 1 ( 1 ; ); s 2 ( 2 ; )
When combined with the fact that the posterior payo¤s of all signals are strictly ordered, this inequality implies that
On the other and, since v and are, respectively, nondecreasing and increasing in ; we have
But when combined with (13) and (14), these inequalities contradict Lemma 5.
A Stylized Application
In practice, online search engines typically display links to their search results in three broad categories: left-hand-side sponsored links, left-hand-side organic links (displayed immediately below the sponsored links), and right-hand-side sponsored links. The engine receives direct revenues from all sponsored links (which are auctioned o¤), but not from the organic ones (which are chosen based on a measure of consumer value). The links on the left normally enjoy a signi…cantly higher acceptance rate (or clickthrough) than those on the right.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that many consumers do not draw a sharp distinction between the top organic links and the sponsored links on the left. 8 Indeed, search engines normally o¤er only mild visual distinction between the two, such as slight background shading. Thus, we can roughly interpret this scenario as the engine showing two types of signals:
a high quality "left-hand-side"signal that is shared by top sponsored and organic links, and a low quality "right-hand-side"signal that includes only lower-revenue sponsored links. 9 The following simple example illustrates how the model can provide a stylized rationale for the above practice:
Example 3 Suppose the Sender (search engine) has three prospects. The …rst two prospects (1 and 2) represent advertisers that share the same value of ; but have di¤erent pro…t levels ; with 1 > 2 ; and therefore, from eq. (12), deliver di¤erent virtual pro…ts for the Sender, Since Conditions 2 and 3 are met, Lemma 10 indicates that the monotonicity constraint is slacked and therefore the optimal disclosure policy solves problem (6).
Lemma 11
The optimal disclosure rule for Example 3 involves two signals s 1 and s 2 . Advertiser i = 1; 2 is assigned signal s i with probability one. The organic prospect, in contrast, serves as Bait and is randomly assigned one of the two signals (with possibly degenerate probabilities). Other things equal, the Bait is assigned the signal of advertiser i with a higher probability if: (1) this advertiser has a larger mass p i ; and (2) the payo¤s of this advertiser are more unordered vis-a-vis the payo¤s of the Bait (i.e., jZ i3 j is large).
Proof. The optimal disclosure rule solves the Sender's problem (6) with P = f1; 2; 3g; U = ff1; 3g; f2; 3gg; and the payo¤s ( i ; v i ) described in the example, so that Z 13 and Z 23 are strictly negative. jZ 23 j, we obtain the opposite corner solution in which 32 = p 3 and 31 = 0: In this case, the Bait is exclusively pooled with advertiser 2 into signal s 2 ; and advertiser 1 receives his own signal s 1 : Third, in all other cases, we obtain an interior solution with 31 ; 32 > 0; so that the Bait shares part of his mass with each advertiser. In this case, both …rst-order conditions above hold with equality and we obtain:
Inspection of this expression delivers the last statement in the Lemma.
The two signals s 1 and s 2 in the Lemma can be interpreted as the "left-hand-side" and "right-hand-side"signals that are used in practice. Moreover, while the organic prospect in the example can in principle serve as Bait for both advertisers, it will be pooled exclusively with the high-pro…t advertiser whenever jZ 13 j is large relative to jZ 23 j. This would occur, for instance, when the di¤erence in pro…tability between the two advertisers is su¢ ciently large. 10 This pooling case can be interpreted as the "bundling" we observe in practice between the top organic links and the left-hand-side sponsored links.
While stylized, this example helps explain why, in practice, not all sponsored links are grouped together (for example, on the right) and also why search engines do not introduce a sharper visual distinction between the top organic and sponsored links on the left (for example, by introducing a third column for the high-revenue sponsored links). Indeed, the example tells us that if all sponsored links were grouped, advertisers that are likely to be ordered would be bundled, therefore reducing pro…ts. And it also tells us that introducing a sharper distinction between organic and sponsored links on the left would make the organic links a less e¤ective bait for these high-revenue sponsored links.
Extensions

Pareto Optimal Allocations
Here we consider the more general problem of maximizing a weighted average of expected Receiver surplus and expected Sender pro…t, rather than focusing on expected pro…t alone.
The objective becomes
where 2 [0; 1] represents an arbitrary Pareto weight on the Receiver. For example, when facing competitive pressure, a platform (Sender) may wish to increase the welfare of each user (Receiver) in order to increase the total number of users that patronize this platform.
As before, we can interpret the Sender as either the direct owner of each prospect or simply as an intermediary between an Advertiser and the Receiver.
From linearity of the expectation operator, the above objective can be expressed as
It follows that the problem of maximizing (15) The di¤erence with the basic case in which = 0 is that the optimal rule becomes progressively more revealing as increases. For instance, in the extreme when = 1
the Sender cares exclusively about Receiver surplus and, therefore, full separation becomes optimal (i.e., all new payo¤s lie on the ray with positive slope and therefore are strictly ordered).
For intermediate levels of ; it may still be optimal to pool some pairs of prospects but not others. Let
so that the payo¤s of any two prospects i and j are ordered if any only if Z ij ( ) 0: For instance, if the original payo¤s of these prospects (( i ; v i ) and ( j ; v j )) were strictly ordered, it follows that the new payo¤s are strictly ordered as well and therefore these prospects are never pooled with each other.
On the other hand, if the original payo¤s of the prospects were unordered, then the new payo¤s remain weakly unordered as long as 2 [0; b ij ]; where
which is inversely proportional to the slope of the line connecting the original payo¤s ( i ; v i ) and ( j ; v j ); measured in absolute value. Beyond this critical value for ; the payo¤s of i and j become strictly ordered and therefore these prospects no longer constitute potential pooling partners for each other.
Note that for the generic case we have b ij 6 = b ik for all i 6 = j 6 = k: Thus, as increases, each prospect i progressively loses its potential pooling partners j, one at a time, in inverse order of the slopes
Receiver Incentives
Here we return to the original problem of maximizing expected pro…ts but we consider the case in which the Sender o¤ers the consumer a subsidy (or tax) conditional on accepting the prospect. We allow the Sender to use a potentially di¤erent subsidy for each signal s.
For expositional clarity, we begin with the case in which both and v lie in [0; 1]; and then consider the case in which can also be negative or larger than 1: For this section, it is also convenient to break any indi¤erence in favor of separating two prospects.
For any given s; with posterior payo¤s E [ ; v j s] ; the optimal subsidy, denoted (s),
where the subsidy is added to consumer value (resulting in a higher acceptance rate) but is also subtracted from the Sender's pro…ts. The solution to this problem is uniquely given by
where a negative subsidy (s) < 0 corresponds to a tax. Accordingly, the net expected pro…t and acceptance rate are both equated to
Substituting this solution in the objective, the optimized payo¤ for the Sender (conditional on s) becomes
This expression has a simple structure, as it is convex in and v (and strictly convex in all directions ; v except those in which + v = 0). Thus, from Jensen's inequality we conclude that full separation is optimal. In particular, for any disclosure rule h ; Si ;
where E [( + v) 2 ] corresponds to expected pro…ts under full separation. Consider, moreover, the "generic" case in which the sum ( i + v i ) is never equal for two di¤erent projects. In this case, it is strictly optimal to fully separate every prospect because, along the interval connecting the payo¤s of any two prospects, the payo¤ function is strictly convex.
Recall that the original motivation for pooling was to increase the acceptance rate of high-pro…t prospects by pooling these "switch" prospects with "bait" prospects. But once subsidies are allowed, the Sender e¤ectively replaces this strategy with (more e¢ cient) direct monetary incentives. Of course, o¤ering such subsidies may prove impractical because the Receiver can potentially game the contract (e.g., there may exist a mass of strategic internet users with very low clicking costs that are not interested in the Advertiser's product per se, but nevertheless click on the ad in order to exploit the subsidy), or it may prove infeasible if the Sender cannot directly contract with the Receiver (e.g., a university may not be capable of o¤ering payments to future employers of its students).
We now extend the above results to the case in which is allowed to lie anywhere along the real line. In this case, we must explicitly restrict the Receiver's acceptance a to lie in 
The resulting constrained problem is
Since the unconstrained optimal subsidy is b (s) = 
The …rst case corresponds to the corner solution in which a = 0 (representing exclusion), the second case corresponds to an unconstrained interior solution, and the last case is the opposite corner solution in which a = 1 (representing 100% acceptance rate).
The optimized payo¤ for the Sender (conditional on s) is therefore
This function is continuous and, since each of its segments is either linear or convex, it remains weakly convex. As a result, the full separation rule remains weakly optimal. What is new relative to the case in which 2 [0; 1] is that any prospect with a negative combined payo¤ ( i + v i ) < 0 is optimally excluded (a = 0), and any prospect with an average payo¤ 1 2 ( i + v i ) greater than 1 receives 100% acceptance rate (a = 1). Notice, …nally, that when two prospects receive 100% acceptance rate they become weakly ordered and therefore the Sender is indi¤erent between separating and pooling these prospects.
That full disclosure is optimal when transfers are allowed is consistent with the …ndings of Ottaviani and Prat (2001) , who show that a monopolist designing a price-discrimination mechanism …nds it optimal to commit to publicly reveal information a¢ liated to the consumer's valuation.
Non-Uniform Acceptance Rate
Here we discuss the case in which the Receiver's reservation value r is drawn from a general distribution G over Sender's expected pro…t for a given disclosure is now
As before, we begin by computing the Sender's expected gain from pooling two prospects i and j into one signalŝ (while disclosing information about the other prospects as before).
This gain is given by
When both prospects have the same acceptance rate G; pooling has no impact. In contrast, when G(v i ) 6 = G(v j ); pooling has two e¤ects. First, as before, it shifts acceptance rate from the more valuable prospect (with a higher rate G) to the less valuable prospect. This e¤ect is captured by the …rst term in (17), which indicates that the shift in acceptance rate raises the Sender's expected pro…ts when the more valuable prospect is also less pro…table (the unordered case), and vice versa.
Second, depending on the curvature of G; pooling may also change the overall acceptance rate. This e¤ect is captured by the second term in (17). For example, when G is strictly concave, pooling increases the overall acceptance rate (by Jensen's inequality the expression in braces is positive), therefore raising pro…ts. The opposite occurs when G is strictly convex.
Once both e¤ects are combined we obtain:
Lemma 12 Pooling two prospects with di¤erent acceptance rates yields (strictly) higher profits for the Sender than separating them if the prospects are (strictly) unordered and G is (strictly) concave, and yields (strictly) lower pro…ts if the prospects are (strictly) ordered and G is (strictly) convex. The remaining cases are ambiguous.
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To further understand this result, it is useful to examine the curvature of the Sender's pro…t function
and so the function is concave (making pooling optimal for the Sender) when both sign ( ) 6 = sign ( v) and G 00 (v) 0, and convex when both sign ( ) = sign ( v) and G 00 (v) 0.
The di¤erence vis-a-vis the case of a uniform acceptance rate is that two ordered prospects will be optimally pooled when G is su¢ ciently concave (in order to increase the overall accep- 12 When G is twice di¤erentiable, we can obtain further intuition for this lemma by examining the curvature of the function
tance rate), and two unordered prospects will be optimally separated when G is su¢ ciently convex (in order to avoid a reduction in the acceptance rate). Nevertheless, several properties of the optimal disclosure rule derived above continue to hold. Most notably, prospects that are pooled together must still lie on a straight line:
Lemma 13 Assume G is di¤erentiable and strictly increasing. In a pro…t-maximizing disclosure rule , for any given signal s 2 S, the payo¤s of the prospects in the pool of s, 
Now consider a new disclosure rule^ that replaces the original signal s with two new signals s 1 ; s 2 ; and for each i 2 P s has^
By construction, we obtain
These equations in turn imply
The Sender's gain from adopting^ relative to is
From (19) and (20) this gain is equal to
which we denote by ("; 1 ; 2 ): Now …x small "; 1 > 0: Notice that ("; 1 ; 0) is zero and the partial derivative @ @ 2 ("; 1 ; 0) is strictly positive:
It follows that ("; 1 ; 2 ) is strictly positive for any small 2 > 0; which contradicts the optimality of the original disclosure rule .
To understand this result, it is useful to re-examine the curvature of the Sender's pro…t function
G(v) in (18). Note that the …rst term in this equation is proportional to v;
whereas the second term is proportional to v 2 : Thus, starting from any arbitrary point ( ; v); provided G 0 (v) > 0 there always exists an ordered direction ( ; v); with su¢ ciently small v 6 = 0, along which the …rst term in (18) is larger than the second term, and therefore G(v) is strictly convex. 13 Consequently, if a given signal pools prospects that do not lie on the same straight line, this signal can always be spread out in a direction of convexity (as in Figure 1 , but now spread out along a line with su¢ ciently small slope), therefore increasing expected pro…ts.
Thanks to this lemma, we can also show that pooling intervals cannot intersect at an interior point:
Lemma 14 Assume G is di¤erentiable and strictly increasing. In a pro…t-maximizing disclosure rule , suppose we have prospects a 1 ; a 2 ; b 1 ; b 2 and signals s 1 ; s 2 such that: a 1 ; b 1 2 P s 1 ; a 2 ; b 2 2 P s 2 ; and the payo¤s of these prospects do not lie on the same line. Then, the inter-
13 Indeed, for small v the acceptance rate G is approximately linear, and therefore the curvature of the Sender's objective is essentially determined by the sign of v. 14 Where [x; y] = f x + (1 ) y :
Proof. Identical to the proof of lemma 4, but with lemma 13 replacing lemma 3 in the last line of the proof.
The remaining results in section 4 are dependant on prospects being pooled or not based exclusively on their ordering. Indeed, since the curvature of G can have a decisive e¤ect on the desirability to pool any given pair of prospects, regardless of their payo¤s, little can be said in general about the optimal pooling graph. In contrast, when the curvature of G is mild, the …ndings of section 3 continue to be relevant. For example, if G is everywhere concave and its curvature is su¢ ciently mild so that strictly ordered prospects remain separated, then all lemmas derived under the uniform assumption remain valid.
Appendix
Before proving Lemmas 8 and 9, and Proposition 1, we derive some preliminary results.
Lemma 15 the expected payo¤ delivered by h 00 ; S 00 i is
where the two terms in braces represent, respectively, the payo¤s delivered by h ; Si are h 0 ; S 0 i : It follows that h 00 ; S 00 i is also optimal. Consequently, from Lemma 2, the set of posterior payo¤s under h 00 ; S 00 i, which includes all posterior payo¤s from the original disclosure rules, must be ordered. 
Proof of Lemma 8.
That b B is convex follows from the fact that the objective in (6) is concave (Lemma 7) and the set of vectors 2 R U that satisfy constraints (7), (8), and (10) (10) and Corollary 1 imply that there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for every n and every i; j U; n ij = C n ji :
Taking the limit as n ! 1; this equality implies that 0 satis…es constraint (10) . In addition, since the objective F ( ) is continuous, 0 must also be an optimum. It follows that 0 2 b B.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9.
We begin with necessity ()). Suppose that 2 b B is not a vertex of b B: Since b B is convex, there must exist an optimum 0 2 b B that is arbitrarily close to and yet 0 6 = :
Indeed, we can select 0 such that, for every i; j 2 U; 
Now let ij = ij 0 ij : Constraint (2), which binds under both and 0 , implies X j2P (i) ij = 0 for all i 2 P:
Since 0 6 = , there must exist a pair i; j 2 V such that ij 6 = 0: Moreover, whenever ij 6 = 0, (21) implies that ji 6 = 0 (with sign( ji ) = sign( ij )), and equation (22) in turn implies that there exists a prospect k 2 P (j); with k 6 = i; such that jk 6 = 0 (with sign sign( jk ) 6 = sign( ji )). It follows that we can select an in…nite sequence of prospects i 1 ; i 2 ; ::: (with repeated elements) such that, for all k = 1; 2; :::; we have: i k 6 = i k+1 and the set of prospects P is …nite, must contain a cycle.
We now turn to su¢ ciency ((). Suppose 2 b B contains a cycle among prospects fi 1 ; i 2 ; :::; i K g: Without loss, denote these prospects f1; 2; :::; Kg: For every k in this set, let k = k;k mod K+1 k;k mod K+1 + k mod K+1;k (i.e., the share of k in signal fk; k mod K + 1g) and let A k = p Z k;k mod K+1 . The …rst-order conditions (9) for weights k;k mod K+1 and k;k mod K 1 (which are both positive) are
Multiplying these …rst-order conditions across k; and rearranging terms, we obtain
We now show that there exist two optima 0 ; 00 2 b B; both di¤erent from ; such that where the values of k satisfy 1 = " and 
